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Tanzania: Managing the bushmeat trade – Is law enforcement the 
answer? 
Martin Reinhardt Nielsen 
 
The bushmeat trade threatens wildlife populations in many parts of Africa compromising the 
integrity of protected areas, conservation of biodiversity and the future of rural households that 
depend on wildlife as a source of income or protein. As a result there are frequent calls to 
tighten enforcement to deter poachers. But limited information is available to determine 
whether enforcement is the solution given interactions between enforcement agents and 
poachers, the cost-benefit ratios of actors in the bushmeat trade and the effect of different 
attributes on the choice between engaging in the bushmeat trade or pursuing alternative 
income generating options. Limited information is furthermore available about the bushmeat 
trade is Tanzania where it occurs clandestinely and is difficult to study. Here I synthesize 
relevant results pertaining to these questions based on three recent papers about the bushmeat 
trade in the Kilombero Valley of Tanzania.  
 
The studies identified 325 actors involved in the bushmeat trade. These include hunters 
shooting wildlife; traders buying meat in bulk from hunters selling packages of meat to local 
consumers or larger clumps of meat to non-local traders passing through the village; and finally 
retailers hired by the traders to sell meat on the street paid a fixed amount per package sold. 
Entry barriers in terms of access to firearms and trusted credit networks appeared to limit 
recruitment into the trade for hunters and traders respectively. Thirty percent of respondents 
had been apprehended one or more times and 66 percent of arrests resulted in payment of a 
bribe whereas a fine was paid in 19 percent of cases. In many cases oﬀenders were beaten 
and/or humiliated. Punishments included being forced to eat raw bushmeat, being beaten 
unconscious and having trigger ﬁngers broken. Hence, interactions with authorities and 
enforcement agents had character of illicit taxation more than implementation of wildlife 
regulations, and rent-seeking enforcement agents used violence to determine the maximum 
amount that the oﬀender was able to pay as a bribe.  
 
Actor group’s cost-benefit ratios were examined using Monte-Carlo simulation and the 
deterrence model as a theoretical basis. Average simulated cost-beneﬁt ratios increased steeply 
up the commodity chain from 0.15–0.43 for hunters, 0.56–0.62 for traders and 0.88 for retailers. 
This suggests that retailers are the actor group for whom the cost-benefit ratios can most easily 
be manipulated to make participation in the trade unprofitable. However, the impact on the 
quantity traded is likely to be minimal, as the trade may simply shift to other actors in the value 
chain. Most traders already sell the meat themselves and entry barriers for retailers are low 
suggesting that they can easily be replaced. Plotting the average cost-beneﬁt ratio as a function 
of the likelihood of apprehension illustrates that a considerable increase is required to make the 
trade non-proﬁtable for hunters and traders. The number of patrols required to make hunting 
non-proﬁtable to the average hunter is as much as 58 times greater than the current level. If 
adjusting only the magnitude of the penalty, ﬁnes of the order of US$ 1500–20 000 depending 
on actor group, as compared to the current average ﬁnes of US$ 20–105, would be needed to 
make the trade non-proﬁtable. However, a fine that is not matched by a relevant likelihood of 
apprehension is clearly meaningless. Hence, increasing the likelihood of apprehension 
sufﬁciently to make hunting unproﬁtable would require a level of patrolling that is unattainable 
considering the staff and funding available in most protected areas in Tanzania.  
 
The effect of enforcement activities will furthermore depend on consumers’ willingness to pay, 
as suppliers will include increasing cost of ﬁnes and bribes in the price of bushmeat. Bushmeat 
in the Kilombero Valley was signiﬁcantly cheaper than domestic animal meat and this may 
  
provide room for suppliers to increase prices to cover additional costs of enhanced enforcement 
efforts. If preference and hence demand for particular species is sufﬁciently strong, this may 
furthermore just drive up the price, provide incentive for targeting these species, and encourage 
a search for ways around increased enforcement and other supply constraints. A price premium 
was in this respect paid for fresh meat of some species and it is likely that this willingness to pay 
higher prices per package reﬂects taste, cultural or other preferences.  
 
A choice experiment was conducted to determine what changes would be most likely to induce 
actors in the commodity chain to shift to an alternative occupation. Specifically, the 325 
respondents were asked to choose between a day of hunting or trading bushmeat and a day of 
salary-based work under varying conditions of law enforcement patrol frequency and 
magnitudes of fines for hunting and trading bushmeat, different salaries in the alternative work 
option and various prices of substitute domestic animal meat, and the donation of a number of 
cows to the household as an often suggested extension strategy to reduce bushmeat hunting. 
The results revealed that patrolling and fines had very low influence on the choice to hunt and 
trade bushmeat. This applied although the ranges were extended beyond those currently 
relevant in the Kilombero Valley. The most important attribute affecting the choice was the daily 
salary in the alternative occupation, which represents the opportunity cost of continuing 
hunting or trading bushmeat relative to taking salary work. Nonlinear prediction at the 
approximate current level of other attributes indicated the likelihood that the average individual 
would choose hunting or trading bushmeat could be reduced to 10% if a job opportunity 
providing a salary of just US$ 3.37 per day was available.  
 
In combination, these studies suggest that a sufﬁcient increase in the likelihood of apprehension 
is untenable as a sole management strategy given current constraints and that facilitating actors 
in the bushmeat trade to move into alternative occupations is more likely to enable wildlife 
populations in the Kilombero Valley to rebound than relying solely on enforcement which has 
resulted in significant declines of several large game species between 1991 and 2009. This 
suggests that perhaps anti-poaching policies should be directed more at increasing the 
opportunity cost of poaching by making better alternative economic opportunities available. At 
the same time, the redirection of work effort would produce compensating production values in 
the new occupations. These efforts should be complemented by interventions targeted at 
reducing the price of domestic animal meat, addressing corruption of enforcement staff, limiting 
the availability of firearms as well as increasing the capacity for law enforcement.  
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